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THE JOHN F. SONNETT MEMORIAL LECTURE
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
Dennis Jacobs*
Dean Treanor, distinguished faculty, students, alumni, colleagues, and
fellow friends of Fordham Law School, I am honored more than I can say to
be invited to deliver this distinguished lecture in the post-centennial year of
this great law school-now, this venerable law school. I am going to
express my gratitude by saying some things that matter to me, that are not
often said, and that distill observations that have (increasingly) bemused me
over the fourteen years that I have been a judge.
The title of my lecture gives little clue, I suspect, as to what I am going to
say; but it is not a tease. I am going to talk about "The Secret Life of
Judges," by which I mean a habit of mind that, among so many admirable
features of the judicial mentality, amounts to a serious and secret bias.
There is a social reluctance to talk about this kind of thing. It sounds
sanctimonious. Then again, a neat thing about giving a lecture is that it
disarms inhibitions about lecturing people. I get to be sanctimonious
without worrying about it.
This lecture is about bias, the judge's inbred preference for outcomes
controlled by proceduralism, the adversary system, hearings and experts,
representation by lawyers, ramified complexity of doctrines and rules,
multiple prongs, and all things that need and use lawyers, enrich them, and
empower them vis-A-vis other sources of power and wisdom.
Let me make this bias concrete by example. If you arrived in an
appellate court as counsel for a medical-malpractice plaintiff, and the three
individuals on the bench were wearing white coats instead of black robes
and had stethoscopes around their necks, I think your heart would sink. I
could tell you that the three doctors deciding your case have taken an oath
to be impartial as between patients and the medical profession and that they
are conscientious, decent individuals who take seriously the obligation to be
neutral. You would not be reassured: You would understand that there is
(at least) an internalized bias that the doctors would not acknowledge
because they would not notice it. A similar dread would come over the
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. These remarks were
made on November 20, 2006, at the 2006 John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture held at




defendant's lawyer if the three judges each had a limb suspended in
traction.
In our courts, judges are lawyers. They are all lawyers. Most of us have
never been, nor want to be, anything else. We are proud of being lawyers.
For many of us (like myself), lawyering is our only talent (assuming we
have any talent at all), and it is the source of as much esteem as we enjoy.
Our calling says a lot about how our minds work, what we respect, and
whom we trust.
I am not-I repeat, I am not-speaking about a bias based upon politics
or agenda, economic class, ethnicity, or para-ethnicity. When I refer to the
secret life of judges, I am speaking of an inner turn of mind that favors,
empowers, and enables our profession and our brothers and sisters at the
bar. It is secret, because it is unobserved and therefore unrestrained-by
the judges themselves or by the legal community that so closely surrounds
and nurtures us. It is an ambient bias.
The result is the incremental preference for the lawyered solution, the
fee-paid intervention or pro bono project, the lawyer-driven procedure, the
appellate dispensation-and the confidence and faith that these things
produce the best results. It is an insidious bias, because it is hard to make
out, in the vast maze of judicial work and outcomes, the statutes, doctrines,
and precedents that are woven together like an elaborate oriental rug in
which the underlying image of the dragon emerges only after you stare for a
while. I discern in this jumble a bias in favor of the bar and lawyers: what
they do; how they do it; and how they prosper in goods and influence. This
is the "figure in the carpet."'
This bias has several effects and ramifications. Judges all too frequently
frame legal doctrines without considering the litigants' transaction costs.
Considering how many of us conscientiously think hard about the economic
consequences of the outcomes we adopt, it seems strange that our cases
reflect an almost complete disregard and ignorance of the costs,
uncertainties, and delays inflicted by the judicial process itself. I think that
is because judges as lawyers cannot see as a problem the activity and
busyness from which our brothers and sisters at the bar draw their
livelihood, their career advancement, their distinction, and (often) their
sense of purpose in life. All of this depends on the ceaseless turning of the
legal machine.
Judges tend to assume that the adversary process assures a fair fight and a
just outcome. And judges work hard to be fair as between the adversarial
positions presented. But almost always, the adversaries on all sides are
lawyers; so adversariness is no great engine for assuring fairness when it
comes to the allocation of decision-making power between lawyers
(adversaries all) and the institutions and populations outside our profession.
The result is not that lawyers and the legal profession always win in court
1. See Henry James, The Figure in the Carpet, reprinted in The Figure in the Carpet
and Other Stories (Frank Kermode ed., Penguin Books 1986).
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contests (even though they are on both sides); but, there is no doubt that
they get to punch above their weight.
As I hope I have made clear, I am talking about altruistic litigation as
well as hourly fee-paid work and work on contingency. For all the good
that public interest lawyers do (and it is a great deal), some of it results in
the short circuit of democratic decision making and coerced policy choices.
Thus, the threat of litigation often compels school boards to suppress all
orthodoxies except those endorsed by the cadres of constitutional lawyers
and constitutional law professors. A school-board member exercising
fiduciary duties will bow to anticipated demands rather than bear the cost of
exercising or testing the board's own rights, if only because the cost of
litigating a flag, a reference to God, a locker search, a dirty word, or
something like that, can easily cost the school board the annual services of a
music teacher or a teacher of remedial reading.
To my observation, judges are blind to this. I think that is because public
interest litigation greatly enhances lawyer influence and-not at all
incidentally-increases the influence and power of judges. Judges love
these kinds of cases. Public interest cases afford a judge sway over public
policy, enhance the judicial role, make the judge more conspicuous, and
keep the law clerks happy.
Whether fee-paid or pro bono publico, when lawyers present big issues to
the courts, the judges receive the big issues with grateful hands; the bar
patrols against inroads on jurisdiction and independence and praises the
expansion of legal authority; and together we smugly congratulate ourselves
on expanding what we are pleased to call the rule of law.
Among the results are the displacement of legislative and executive
power, the subordination of other disciplines and professions, and the
reduction of whole enterprises and industries to damages. Examples come
ready to hand, though, speaking as I do as a judge, I am constrained from
citing specifics of controversies that may come before me. In generalities,
let me observe,
* Judicial power over the legislature and the executive is dilated by
constitutional litigation, much of which is lawyer-driven. Often,
the plaintiff's standing is made to rest on largely notional,
abstract harms (like annoyance or anxiety), and sometimes the
existence of the plaintiff is a recruitment detail that is easily
arranged.
* Through such constitutional litigation, judges get to direct the
work of educators, police, child protection officers, and many
other professionals who have training to discharge critical
responsibilities that require their expertise and experience.
" Class actions and consent decrees allow judges to operate prisons
and schools, to force appropriations, and to channel funds.
* In mass tort, judges hold in their hands the fate of vast
enterprises and can cause their extinction, with capitalization
28572007]
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forfeit to distribution between lawyers and plaintiffs and workers
let go.
Judges who issue expansive rulings in these spheres enjoy wide esteem
and reputation. There are judges whose fine reputations rest in part on the
ability to handle and administer innumerable claims through litigation and
settlement, pretty much without regard to whether the claims themselves are
based on fraud, corrupt experts, perjury, and other things that would be
deplored and persecuted by the legal profession if done within other
commercial fields. 2
The broadest judicial bias I see, and the one I will describe most vaguely,
is the bias in favor of legal complexity. The volumes of the third edition of
the Federal Reporter spread themselves like kudzu vine over the shelves of
law libraries. I will offer no example, because I would be honor-bound to
cite myself as a chief offender, but it is a problem when the complexity of
the law causes laymen to view the legal process as either political or as
essentially random. This phenomenon is made visible in the papers of pro
se litigants, who rarely bother to read the trial court decisions that reject
their claims, and proceed to appeal on the theory (perhaps not altogether
misguided) that the sheer, ramified, sprawling patterns of law will (in the
hands of the right judge) yield a substantial payment or a sweet revenge.
It is an observed fact that the complexity of doctrines and opinions (not
to mention the discovery of new doctrines) evokes praise and respect from
within the profession. But our highly ramified litigation system imposes
vast costs on other fields of endeavor, on our democratic freedoms, and on
the unrepresented and the non-litigious.
The law reviews seem to have exhausted all topics dealing with bias in
the law and the ethics and infractions of other professions. I asked one of
my law clerks to check to see how many articles have dealt with the bias of
judges toward the dominance and control of the legal profession, and my
clerk came up dry.3 That does not surprise me, because if judges have this
unconscious bias, so (I think) do law professors, for the same reasons-and
students, for the same (and other) reasons. Scholarly papers undertake to
expose and demonstrate the institutional and cultural biases of the law in
every direction but this one. It is not for me to say whether I am making the
point of this lecture effectively; but at least I can say that the competition is
thin.
2. This point has been made in the asbestos context. See, e.g., Lester Brickman,
Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 833, 911 (2005) ("[T]he
pervasiveness of the absence of application of ethical rules to asbestos litigation and to a
large extent, to asbestos bankruptcy proceedings as well, can only stand as an indictment of
the courts, disciplinary authorities and indeed, the legal profession."); Lester Brickman, On
the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship
and Reality, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 33, 37 (2003).
3. Subsequent to this Lecture, Professor Benjamin Barton has posted a paper that
discusses this bias. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of
the Legal Profession? (Apr. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftnabstractid=976478
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Why do we not notice this bias that I am talking about? If you are with
me so far, and you now agree (or started out believing) that judges have a
bias in favor of legalism and the legal profession, you may wonder as I
have, why it is not noticed. Actually, it is a very familiar phenomenon that
we do not recognize our bias as such. One tends to assume that bias has a
nasty face, and that decent people shrink away instinctively. But some
forms of bias are culturally embedded and are exercised with popular or
elite approval.
Bias is not a moral evil. Everyone feels tugs of loyalty; everyone should.
The bias I am talking about is more finely characterized as a tropism, an
instinctive turning to follow a source of vital energy. That is what the
sunflower does. But it is one thing to turn to follow the sun, and it is
another to follow the American Bar Association (ABA), the law schools,
law clerks, and the sound of applause.
Judges are susceptible to the opinions of others in our profession. But
the bias in favor of more law, more procedure, and more process is in great
measure bred in the bone of a lawyer. A judge is trained in the law;
virtually all of us have high self-approval and a high regard for our
profession, its processes, its culture and values, and its judgments-the
profession which (after all) did loft judges to the bench, where we
presumably wanted to go.
The tropism in favor of what lawyers do, and our tendency to expand the
spheres of activity in which lawyers act and control, comes clothed in
virtue. It is seen by us mainly as respect for due process, as the open door
of the courthouse, as a flowering of the rule of law-and so excesses are
viewed with indulgence as a Tocquevillian quirk of the American character.
But it is unbecoming for judges to dismiss this phenomenon. It matters that
our conduct as judges is reinforced by the support and praise that we get
from colleagues, lawyers, bar associations, and law schools. I think fair-
minded people should recognize the dangers that arise when judges, as the
final arbiters for allocating vast power, money, and influence, are all
members of the same (self-regulating) profession-and often of the same
professional groups and social environments. It is a matter of like calling
unto like.
Judges adhere to tight ethical constraints that keep us honest in that way
and to that degree; but (ironically) some of those same constraints tend to
reinforce our professional bias by insulating us from the influences of
politics and (non-law) commerce. Unless we make an effort, we can
become disconnected from the values and perceptions of the larger public.
The more we obey the constraints that isolate us within a circle of legal
culture, the more we are left to be judged, evaluated, and flattered (or not)
by the nourishing, attentive, knowledgeable circle of lawyers, law students,
and professors-which (to make matters worse) includes often the most
charming and scintillating people in the community.
The mystique of the judicial process, and its power and pretension in this
country, is pretty much all based on the idea of neutrality. If that idea is
2007] 2859
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deflated, by puncture or slow leak, it is bad for judges and for the larger
community. Our work is subject to hostile critiques; and, if we do not
acknowledge and restrain our bias, others will notice, and forces will
marshal to rein us in.
These critiques are often classified as attacks on judicial independence,
and resisted as interference, or dismissed as ignorant. Thus, a great theme
of the legal profession is emphatic support for judicial independence. That
is a good thing, and I enjoy my independence as much as the next judge;
but judges should consider and appreciate that one effect (maybe a motive)
of the bar's avid support of judicial independence is to make judges
"independent" of many influences (good and bad) that compete with the
dominant influence over judges that is exerted by fellow lawyers, bar
associations, and law professors. This support of judicial power by the bar
may be a pillar of law, but it can also operate as group loyalty, the
protection of turf, or a reciprocal commitment to the ascendency of judges
and lawyers.
This bias I am talking about keeps us from seeing obvious things. For
example, bar associations nowadays are chiefly trade groups. It is naive to
think that the legal profession is the only disinterested player in our
economic life. And bar groups are highly political. The ABA has formally
adopted and announced hundreds of positions on virtually every issue in
political dispute: You can look them up. It lobbies for those views in
legislatures; it promotes them in amicus briefs filed in the courts. Yet
hundreds of federal judges are members; thousands in the state and local
courts. The canons of judicial conduct4 make space for that anomaly.
The canons broadly warn that "[a] judge should refrain from political
activity." 5 But the same canon (7) has a proviso: "this should not prevent a
judge from engaging in the activities described in Canon 4,"' 6 which says
that "[a] judge may serve as a member, officer, or director of an
organization.., devoted to the improvement of the law."'7 And the
commentary positively "encourage[s]" a judge to "contribute to the
improvement of the law" by various means, expressly including "through a
bar association." 8 Hospitably, the commentary allows a judge to "receive
as a gift travel expense reimbursement including the cost of transportation,
lodging, and meals, for the judge and a relative incident to the judge's
attendance at a bar-related function." 9
The legal profession, like all other fields, should be able to tap the
experience and wisdom of its leading members, judges among them. And
4. Code of Conduct for United States Judges (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch I.html.
5. Id. Canon 7.
6. Id. Canon 7C.
7. Id. Canon 4C.
8. Id. Canon 4 cmt.
9. Id. Canon 5C(4) cmt.
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there are times and places for that; at one time, the organized bar may have
been such a forum. But now?
Judges who are members of the ABA are technically in an auxiliary for
judges in which they presumably participate in the development of legal
ideas. But allowing judges to join a trade association so that they can
collaborate with the membership in developing the law seems to me to
make matters much worse rather than better. In any event, the expedient of
a judges' auxiliary would not be tolerated in any other ethical context. If
there were a judges' auxiliary to the American Bankers Association or the
Brotherhood of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, I am sure they would love
to have us, and would happily work with us on shaping legal improvements.
What if there were a judges' auxiliary to the Tobacco Institute or the
American Insurance Association that paid my way to their conventions
(with my relative), where I could work with them shoulder to shoulder on
beneficial improvements in the law? Why assume that the improvements
favored by the ABA are less self-serving than the improvements favored by
other professional and trade groups?
When the ABA considers improvements in the law, it usually comes
down on the side of punitive damages, attorney's fees, the expansion of
causes of action, and new areas of regulation that require maintenance by
lawyers (such as speech at election time). I do not claim to be any better
than the next one, but I would be uncomfortable being a guest of the ABA
on well-oiled occasions when such improvements are discussed. All of this
is made worse by the fact that the ABA often litigates as amicus curiae (and
I will pass over without comment the ABA's evaluation of judicial
nominees).
Of course, judges should be involved in the development of the law-
case by case, chiefly. No doubt, judges also read some books, go to debates
and forums, and attend seminars. But the idea that judges will develop the
law under the sponsorship and aegis of a powerful interest group should
provoke disquiet-and would, but for the fact that (with some notable
exceptions) judges do not see this as an issue.
I sometimes think that the problem at bottom is really a lack of respect by
lawyers for other people. Judges live chiefly in a circle of lawyers. Our
colleagues are lawyers; happily, our friends are lawyers (and I am hoping to
keep some after this lecture); the only outside income a federal judge can
earn (aside from royalties) is from teaching in law schools (with the idea, I
suppose, that they furnish a nonpartisan environment); and the only political
and trade organizations we can join are bar associations.
But outside that circle there are people who are just as fully absorbed by
other pursuits that deserve consideration and respect. Judges need a
heightened respect for how nonlawyers solve problems, reach
compromises, broker risks, and govern themselves and their institutions.
There are lawyers on the one hand; and just about everybody else is the
competition in the framing of values and standards of behavior.
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In that competition, judicial bias has eroded the independence and
influence of doctors, medical administrators, insurance underwriters,
engineers, manufacturers, the military, the police, wardens and corrections
officers, the clergy, employers, and teachers and principals.
I think that judges ought to appreciate that they operate under an
internalized conflict of interest when they deal with all of these categories
of people, and others, and that (as someone observed) divided loyalties are
rarely divided down the middle. There is a great danger that, by the
subordination of other professions, callings, and centers of power (and of
their judgment and discretion), we are losing indispensable influences.
Another consequence of biased vision is the assumption that if something
is of great importance, it can be safely left to lawyers. That is fine when it
comes to statutory interpretation and such, but lawyers lack humility in
approaching great matters. As judges, we tend to assume that adversarial
hearings and expert testimony will render the judge omni-competent and fit
to decide the great questions, and that a legal mind is the highest and most
useful development of mental capacity.
The mind-set is that if something is of great importance-such as speech,
thought, and expression; race, identity, and sexuality; life and death-it
cannot be safely and properly left chiefly to anyone else. How else does
one account for the fixation on issues such as capital punishment and the
right to die, given that capital punishment cases are few (at least in these
parts), and that death is coming for us as a certainty, regardless of whether
we classify it as an entitlement? As we exercise power over all the basic,
ultimate, and transcendent things, I think that judges should consider how
we inevitably diminish the influence of doctors and juries, clergy and social
workers, legislatures, and the ordinary citizen.
The legal mind is indispensable to lawyering, and for other purposes it is
perfectly okay in its way. But it has its limitations. For example, every
problem-solving profession-except ours--quickly adopts as preferred the
solution that is simplest, cheapest, and most efficacious, or (as they say)
elegant. Also, our legal mind is invasive: It has institutional advantages for
subordinating other modalities of thought, and it presses those advantages.
And it is triumphalist about its expansions of influence. The uninitiated,
who lack the legal mind, are harnessed to our purposes as jurors or are put
to the margins. What nonlegal professionals think can be dismissed as
arbitrary and capricious, or (if needed to assist the legal process) can be
classified as expert opinion, to be weighed by us and by our standards.
The legal mind can hold its own with the competition in terms of rigor; I
have one, and I make no apology for it. But at least I have come to admit
that, depending on the question, the legal mind may be insufficient or may
be inferior to the moral imagination; the scientific method; the practical arts
of healing, politics, and entrepreneurship; the promptings of loyalty, faith,
and patriotism; and the experience and expertise found elsewhere and
among others.
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If you are not with me this far, you will have little interest in this last
question: What can be done to correct this bias and to place the legal
profession again on a footing of parity and fair competition with other
professionals and activities that have a right to influence in our
communities and our culture? In a nutshell, judges should lead the bar in
exercising the self-restraint and self-discipline that is incumbent on a
profession that has a virtual monopoly on legislative power and a monopoly
by patent on the power of the judiciary, and that is largely self-regulating.
Other professions, by ethics or honor, exert the imagination and self-
possession to avoid exercising all the power they have. Let me give an
incendiary example.
When a military force occupies a conquered province, the military has
vast power and may be tempted to run things in a way that best serves the
dominance and comfort of the military profession. A military solution can
be found for every challenge; such solutions fit the salient talents and skill-
sets of military commanders. No doubt it is of the greatest convenience to
the military and a great comfort to them to impose early curfews; to censor
letters; to close the outspoken newspapers and the satirical magazines; to
take over the radio, the police, and the prisons; to shoot looters; to draft
strikers; to favor military justice; and to commandeer all the better hotels. I
think there is a natural temptation for the military officers in charge to do all
these things because these are measures that subordinate a lot of conduct
that undermines military administration, and because no doubt lifelong
professional military officers might believe that these measures are
effective and fair and constitute the best design for the organization of the
society under their thumbs. Others in the military might applaud the tidy
administration that results.
We (in the profession of law) recoil from such measures in part because
it is not our profession; it does not fit our salient talents and skill-sets; it
puts to the margin what we do and the sphere in which we operate; and so
we lack faith in it. It seems to us, viscerally illegitimate.
But an enlightened military recognizes that imposition of all these
measures on an ongoing or permanent basis improperly subordinates other
spheres of life. The military types (I am not one) seem to control
themselves through a concept of honor. Maybe judges should consider
their example. I concede that a country could do worse than suffer rule by
lawyers: I would prefer a tyranny of law to life under a military regime.
But outside our professional sphere, the dominance of the legal profession
and the judiciary is resented more than we appreciate.
As a matter of self-awareness and conscience, judges should accept that
the legal mind is not the best policy instrument, and that lawyer-driven
processes and lawyer-centered solutions can be unwise, insufficient, and
unjust, even if our friends and colleagues in the legal profession lead us that
way. For the judiciary, this would mean a reduced role, but not a
diminished one if the judiciary is elevated by considerations of honor, self-
restraint, and respect for other influences.
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